Shooting Board Presentation_RedactedAny notes taken during the meeting are for the sole purpose of this discussionNote Taking
Officer Jason Kirk Vehicle: 18024DID: 6051Hired: October 7, 2002Uniform: L/S Patrol UniformLast qualification: October 9, 2013 (AR‐15)Rounds discharged: One (AR‐15)Additional Force used: NoneInjuries: N/AInvolved Officer
Officer Leonard KimVehicle: 18024DID: 10139Hired: January 4, 2007Uniform: L/S Patrol UniformLast qualification: September 9, 2013Rounds discharged: Four (.45)Additional Force used: NoneInjuries: N/AInvolved Officer
Officer David Frazier Vehicle:DID: 10144Hired: January 2007Uniform: S/S Patrol UniformLast qualification: September 12, 2013Rounds discharged: Four (.45)Additional Force used: NoneInjuries: N/AInvolved Officer
Officer Ricardo Ramirez Vehicle: 18024DID: 5979Hired: October 22, 2001Uniform: S/S Patrol UniformLast qualification: October 4, 2013Rounds discharged: Four (.40)Additional Force used: NoneInjuries: N/AInvolved Officer
Officer Brent Woods Vehicle: DID: 10125Hired: January 4, 2007Uniform: S/S Patrol UniformLast qualification: September 20, 2013Rounds discharged: Four (.45)Additional Force used: NoneInjuries: N/AInvolved Officer
•09:47:46–CAD Call entered•09:48:20–1B66 Dispatched•09:49:21 –1B66 On scene (per CAD)•09:50:40–1S31 –Have her on 3rd•09:52:20‐1B66 – Holding something in her hand•09:53:11 –1S35 – Need one person only to engage her•09:54:03–DJK9 en route•09:54:00–MET Unit requested•09:54:00–1S31 Code AR•10:00:51–Drop Code Red Timeline
•10:01:08 –1S35 –She is not following direction just shaking her head no•10:01:45–1B7 – North and South LBB traffic Stop•10:02:04‐1S35 IC per 1S31•10:02:25 –1B33 ‐10‐21 PO and clear windows•10:03:10 –Fox will stay in area but not over•10:05:31–CP on 3rd•10:15:19–DJK9 –Going to make approach and give commands•10:15:31–stand by on last •10:18:18‐she is hiding behind car jacket over handTimeline
•10:19:10 –1S31 ‐Going to try to contact on PA and want the MET unit to have chance to talk to her•10:22:40–Boat3 in post office and have access to upper floors•10:31:52 –Stage 1 tactical alert•10:37:15 –MET3 – trying to verbally communicate with her she is not acknowledging or speaking•10:41:01–Fox to do flyover to check perimeter•10:43:49–have a good eye on her has keys on a lanyard in left hand on the roof of the car palm down also … in the style of a handgun in her right hand but completely coveredTIMELINE
•10:44:30– Officers on west side of her are again trying to make contact•10:47:22–MET3 tried Spanish as well•10:56:03–MET3 still doing verbal commands Spanish and English and getting no response•11:03:41–Fox –If you are planning West approach there is a large crowd at Promenade•11:09:37–Met Unit still trying to contact female still no response•11:13:24– still giving commands & no response•11:14:43–Boat3 right hand clutched against chest covered by jacket, female leaning against car•11:18:16 – Misc. in call SWAT Activation @ 10:53•11:19:18–Both EAT teams have less lethal and AR deployedTIMELINE
•11:31:27 –It’s a gun a gun in her right hand•11:31:46–Fox broadcasts pointing a gun, shots have been fired•9:50 – 11:31 –Roughly 1 hour 41 minutes •19 Seconds elapse from the time she has the gun until shots are fired•17 shots fired•1stshot to 2ndshot .19 seconds•1 shot to last shot 2.95 secondsShots
East EAT
Officer Kirk’s View
Officer Kirk’s View ~190’
•Provided rifle by Sergeant VandenBosch (Code AR @0954)•Took position he estimated as 80‐100 yards away(~63 yards) •Tall brick post office as back drop•Laid prone on sidewalk•Could see suspect when she looked over car•Knew location of both EAT’s•Could hear MET unit and others talking to her•Saw her turn remove jacket covering arm saw the handgun•10 –15 feet from where she started and in street 5 feet•She was pointing gun and advancing at officers•Fired 1 round (~11:31)Officer Kirk
Officer Ramirez’s View
Officer Ramirez’s View ~84’
•Working MET 3 (responded from FSD)•Responded to CP •Walked west on 3rdstreet and tried to engage her•When she did not respond he joined west EAT•Standing on curb leaning against vehicle with left arm on top and jacket covering her right arm•Started negotiating with PA while Kim covered•Second car joined EAT with blanket on window•Switched to that cars PA with Woods covering•Tried English, Spanish and non verbal communication•Sergeant Solomita took over on PA and he took position at door with gun out•Subject stepped away from car as directed by Solomita and dropped jacket Officer Ramriez
•Recognized gun as a Baretta•Initially pointed towards wall as she walked •Yelled gun to alert officers•Told her to drop gun several times •She continued to walk towards them and pointed gun at them•Estimated fired 3 times (4 actual•She fell and dropped gunOfficer Ramirez
Officer Wood’s View
Officer Wood’s View ~85’
•Initially with officers at closest B&W–She pointed hand covered by jacket them several times–Moved from closest vehicle to car further away–Multiple officers tried verbal and non verbal communication•Officer brought third car with ballistic shield on window to location •Moved to lethal cover by drivers door while Officer Cochran took less lethal shotgun•When Solomita took over PA Ramirez exited car and I was directly behind him over top of light barOfficer Woods
•She walked towards officers and dropped jjacketexposing gun in her right hand•Yelled for her to drop the gun•Continued to walk towards us and each step her right arm moved from pointing north to pointing at us•Felt immediate threat and fired 4 times (4 actual)•Upon being shot she dropped gun and fell to groundOfficer Woods
Officer Kim’s View
•Drove east on 3rdfrom LBB•Stopped car and took position behind middle car •Himself and several other officers tried to get her to acknowledge them by offering her help and asking her to comply•During this time believes she is deliberately pointing hand with jacket covering it in direction of officers•Believes she walks 3 times towards a post on car–Felt she was never fully exposed to allow him to shoot•Started walking towards us dropped jacket to expose gunOfficer Kim’s View
•Heard an officer yell gun several times•She continued towards officer turning body and position of gun so it was pointing towards officers•Feared for safety and fired 4 times (4 actual)Officer Kim’s View
Officer Frazier’s View ~80’
•Working with J. Ward and were 1ston scene–Other officers arrived very soon after –They were to the east •He and partner used mailboxes on south side of 3rdstreet for cover•Noted jacket over her right hand holding something•He asked her to put it down and she verbally said no•Sergeant Solomita started to use car that was west of them to engage suspect•Joined west EAT and stood next to car Solomita was giving directions from. •Stood at rear and by truck of B&W•Suspect ignored commands and looked up several times to see where officers were •Dropped jacket and turned towards EAT•Clearly saw gun•Suspect walked towards them and pointed gun ibn their direction •Feared for safety and fired 4 times (4 actual)•Suspect fell and dropped gunOfficer Frazier
Suspect’s View
Bullet Impacts
Bullet Impacts
Bullet Impacts
Video
•GSW Left Jaw•GSW Right Shoulder (clavicle)•GSW Left Flank•Graze Left Shoulder (clavicle)Suspect Injuries
The Communications & Training Division was instructed to review department policy as it pertains to the Incident Command System (ICS) and answer the following questions:1. When on an incident where an Incident Commander is running an incident, does the Watch Commander have any authority over the incident? Yes.2. Who has the ultimate authority? The highest ranking official on scene.3. Does the Watch Commander have the authority to relieve the Incident Commander and take the incident over? Yes, if they are the highest ranking official on scene. 4. Does existing policy clearly define these roles? Yes.a. If not make recommendations for policy change as to rank structure and roles of the two positions and who has the authority to relieve an Incident Commander i.e., higher ranking (on scene or not on scene), Watch Commander, etc. Policy clearly states order of rank and authority over an incident72 Hour Projects ‐Training
• The Chief of Police has directed that ICS be used to managedisaster/tactical deployments in accordance with NIMS/SEMSguidelines.(Operation Order _Disaster/Tactical Deployment. November2010. Number 111-A)-The Incident Command System (ICS) allows for an"agency official" to direct a change in command. In ICS, this is known as"transfer of command." Course materials for ICS200, states that "uponarriving at an incident the higher ranking person will either assumecommand, maintain command as is, or reassign command to a thirdparty." It further states that, "In some situations or agencies a lowerranking but more qualified person may be designated as the incidentcommander.(IS200.b Introduction to Incident Command System Unit 4 _Functional Areas & Positions)-The general rule of thumb in ICS is thatday-to-day rank within an organization does not matter when in an ICSorganization and job qualifications should determine positions within theICS organization, including Incident Command. The arrival of a morequalified person does not necessarily mean a change in command. Themore qualified individual may choose to act in an advisory capacity to thecurrent Incident Commander, or recommend someone else come andassume command.72 Hour Projects ‐Training
• LBPD policy states, "In the absence of the Chief of Police and the regularly designated Commanding Officers of Bureaus, Divisions or Sections, the on-duty Watch Commander shall be designated as the ranking authority of the Department. In the absence of the Watch Commander, the Senior Field Lieutenant shall carry this authority and responsibility. (LBPD Manual Section 2.2.1 -Command Authority/Watch Commander.) recommends the word "Sections" be removed from LBPD Manual Section 2.2.1 -Command Authority/Watch Commander.• LBPD policy addresses the issue of having two or more of the same rank on scene stating, "When two or more share the highest rank and no one has been designated as in command, the officer having seniority in rank shall be in command." (LBPD Manual Section 2.2.2 - Command of Scene – Incident Command.) 72 Hour Projects ‐Training
• As explained above and according to LBPD policy, rank would be as follows (in descending order):1 . Chief of Police2. Deputy Chief (most seniority in rank is highest ranking)3. Police Commander (most seniority in rank is highest ranking)4. Watch Commander5. Police Lieutenant (most seniority in rank is highest ranking)6. Police Sergeant (most seniority in rank is highest ranking7. Police Corporal (most seniority in rank is highest ranking)8. Police Officer (most seniority in rank is highest ranking)72 Hour Projects ‐Training
•LBPD policy specifically addresses the issue of expertise recommending that the ranking officer should consider assuming command due to their expertise, stating in part, "Supervisory or command officers should consider assuming the role of incident commander when any of the following circumstances exist: • When the current incident commander could be better used in a different capacity, e.g., operations officer• When the ranking supervisor or command officer determines that their expertise would be better served as incident commander • When he/she has begun to give direction and/or orders careful consideration should always be given prior to assuming the role of incident commander to ensure a smooth transition of incident leadership." LBPD policy however, does not mandate a change in command due to expertise or rank, this is discretionary and up to the ranking official, which is in agreement with the ICS philosophy. (LBPD Manual Section 2.2.2 - Command of Scene -Incident Command.) •There is no policy that prohibits a Watch Commander that relieves a Lieutenant as an Incident Commander, from maintaining his/her status as the Watch Commander. Therefore, a Watch Commander may assume the role of Incident Commander and still act as the Watch Commander.72 Hour Projects ‐Training
72 Hour Projects ‐Training •Training Section to conduct a debrief with all shooting officers, EAT officers, officers in the Postal Office, and all Sergeants and Lieutenants ‐On Saturday, February 8, 2014, Sergeant LeBaron held debrief of the incident with the following individuals present: Lieutenant Davenport, Sergeants Solomita, Vanden Bosch, Benson, and McGuire, Officers J. Kirk, Archer, R. Ramirez, Booker, Carter, Manzo, A. Garcia, J. Ortiz, Frazier, Ward, B. Woods, Kim, Cochran, and Piper. Also in attendance were two Department of Mental Health clinicians (Emily Brennan and Frank Mullnix). These individuals work as the partners of Officers Ramirez and Booker in the M.E.T. detail. The circumstances leading up to and following the shooting were discussed•Training Section to conduct a separate debrief with only the Sergeants and Lieutenants listed below related to supervision and command and control of this incident. On Saturday, February 8, 2014, Sergeant LeBaron reviewed the circumstances surrounding OIS 13-019 with the following supervisory personnel: Lieutenants Davenport, Kanaley, and Morgan. Also in attendance were Sergeants Solomita, Vanden Bosch, and Benson.
•Communications Section to develop procedure to ensure all SWAT callouts are broadcast on all radio frequencies to alert field units that SWAT has been activated•The Communications Center developed procedural guidelines associated to critical incidents. For those incidents involving SWAT, a broadcast of the call out SHALL occur.•The radio operator will ensure a broadcast is conducted on all "active" radio channels at the time of the incident. Additionally, to ensure field personnel are aware of critical incidents in general, the same broadcast will occur to encompass those incidents for situational awareness. The following procedures have been established as they relate to critical incidents. Each incident contains characteristics with their own unique circumstances. •Due to those ever changing circumstances the following procedures are to be considered at the onset of the incident. 72 Hour Projects ‐Communications
Field units should be apprised of critical incidents. This can be accomplished through a radio broadcast. This broadcast would include all "active" radio channels at the time of the incident. In instances involving a SWAT call out, a radio broadcast SHALL occur.Floor supervision will ensure that the immediate need in the field has been addressed; medical attention, support personnel/equipment, field supervision notification, etc. As directed, all OIS incidents require a call to Fire dispatch requesting a medical response once supervision has been made aware of the shooting. If field units opt for an emergency transport of injured personnel floor supervision shall notify the appropriate emergency room. Floor supervision will monitor the incident channel to develop understanding of the situation. This will include monitoring the radio operator to ensure all resources are applied to assist in the radio transmissions. 72 Hour Projects ‐Communications
As with any incident, evaluate the need for additional resources within the center for operational enhancement; considering a Tactical Dispatch component, augmenting the radio operator with an assistant, and extra staff to man the supervisor's line (9650), LBCOP, are just a few of those areas one could optimize operations.Critical incidents bring the need for an "all" hands on deck philosophy and with this commonly used term comes the pressure to require Communications personnel to man their stations. This would include the cost of losing breaks and lunches. If such an incident requires this approach, documentation should follow this direction allowing for proper tracking and compensation later, if needed. The critical incident and its impact to the Communications Center should be evaluated on a consistent level. Such evaluation should allow for determining the need for additional personnel outside the current staffing level. This would include holding over a watch. If this occurs, as with any incident rising to this level, the Communications Division Lieutenant SHALL be called and provided the details.• The procedures contained within this document are designed to help facilitate guidance during those critical incidents the Communication Center experiences. Please share this information with your team members72 Hour Projects ‐Communications
•Write a Watch Report and send out department wide address radio discipline and things that should not be aired over the radio such as victim witness names, conditions of victim/witnesses, weapon description when an incident is over/static unless related to officer safety. Contact Deputy Chief Luna for additional information and Communications Supervisor Runnels72 Hour Projects –Patrol Bureau
• Officers are reminded that all communications on the police radio is monitored and recorded. Per Training Bulletin #65, Communication Radio Transmission Procedure, officers should adhere to the following radio transmission principles:•Accuracy- A misspelled name may yield a response of "NO WANT" on an actual wanted person•Brevity-Airtime is precious, especially in the West Division during the WINVIII hours. Plan your transmissions and keep officer safety in mind. Manual Section 7.3.2 requires MDC use for routine communication in order to reserve radio air time for emergency use•Clarity-Speak clearly, using radio codes and phrases•Courtesy-Teamwork requires courtesy. Phrases like "Please" and "Thank you" are not necessary, however officers and dispatchers will be courteous and respectful at all times.• Please ensure that personal information such as victim/witness names, medical conditions, phone numbers and other information that may be potentially sensitive to an investigation are not aired. Examples might include, the personal phone number of an officer, the description of the weapon used in a crime (not related to officer safety) or the medical status of an accident victim being treated at the hospital.• Staff from the Communications Center conducted a one hour block of instruction regarding this topic in the first AOTC trimester of 2014.72 Hour Projects –Watch Report
•Commander Rocchi to conduct a debrief with the two on‐duty Lieutenants, Davenport and Kanaley•On February 5, 2014, Commander Rocchi met with Lieutenants D. Davenport and J. Kanaley regarding the Incident Command for OIS 13‐019. The following was discussed: •Identification of the Incident Commander and timely notification to the communications center •Broadcast of the command post location to responding units •Communication at the command post Tactical T earn considerations•Tactical Team considerations72 Hour Projects –Patrol
•Administration Bureau to conduct an audit of all police vehicles that are equipped with a MDT and Radio to determine if they are functioning. During this OIS incident it was reported several MDT's had no internet access and the WC radio and MDT were not functioning.72 Hour Projects –Admin Bureau
•During the OIS incident on November 16, 2013, several Patrol units reported losing Internet access from the computer in their vehicles. In addition, the Watch Commander Lieutenant Daren Davenport stated his Patrol vehicle's computer system was unable to connect and his hand held radio lost charge. Sergeant Richard Bell contacted Lieutenant Davenport who said that vehicle #18554 computer was having connection problems preventing him from accessing any police computer systems. A check of unit history also showed that the Communication Center indicated on two separate occasions they were not receiving AVL data from the vehicle. The AVL data for vehicle #18554 that day showed inconsistent readings. This would indicate that the modem in the vehicle was not functioning properly on that day. The vehicle has since been inspected by Information Technology staff and found to be fully functional.•In addition, Lieutenant Davenport said that his hand held radio lost charge on the protracted event and he had no method to recharge or replace the battery in the field. Each of the Sergeant Expeditions has a Bank Charger. However, there are no extra batteries in the Expeditions. The Department should consider purchasing extra batteries for these Sergeant vehicles•The Citrix server (virtual desktop) controls Internet access for the entire fleet. Any loss of connection would result in all vehicles losing connectivity. Several projects are underway to limit this possibility including upgrading the Netmotion servers, upgrading the Internet proxy server and expanding Internet bandwidth to accommodate more users.72 Hour Projects –Admin Bureau
Overhead